This paper demonstrates that winning a takeover bidding contest can be`bad news' and, consequently, losing can be`good news.' This is true even when all bidders act rationally in their own best interests with perfect information on their valuations. Bidders with toeholds rationally bid above their valuations and possibly suer losses in equilibrium. This equilibrium strategy of`bidding to lose' played by partial owners leads to the`owner's curse.' The paper provides an explanation for acquirer losses without recourse to managerial`hubris' and/or agency problems. The presence of partial owners also has strong implications for the choice of selling mechanisms: rms should not be sold using a rst price sealed-bid auction. The presence of large blockholders also acts as a costless defensive measure and partially substitutes for other costly defensive measures. The model gives rise to predictions on (1) the type of acquirers more likely to make losses; (2) the choice of auction procedures; (3) the eect of managerial ownership on rm value; (4) the existence of initial bid premia; and (5) the incentives of rms to engage in share repurchase, private placement and debt-for-equity swaps in the face of a takeover threat.
Introduction
This paper provides a rational explanation for bidders with toeholds to possibly bid up to levels higher than their own valuations. The analysis, in addition to taking into account the strategic interactions between bidders, recognizes the stylized fact that many bidders in a takeover contest accumulate substantial toeholds before bidding. 1 While proting from a toehold is not necessarily the primary objective of a blockholder, it plays a signicant role in the formulation of his bidding strategy. In the event that a blockholder wins a bidding contest, it is then possible for him { even with strictly private valuations { to make a signicant loss. Thus, an alternative rationale is provided to the hubris and/or agency conict rationales to explain the large losses often incurred by acquirers. 2 The rst part of the paper shows that an incumbent-blockholder, who has some private benets of control, nds it optimal to compete with a bidder without a toehold who values the target for the synergy gains that it may generate. The players' optimal bidding strategies in a progressive bidding contest are derived and the incumbent-blockholder is shown to be committed to bid up to a certain level above his own valuation before dropping out. For the incumbent-blockholder, winning the contest at a bid higher than his valuation can only result in an overpayment. Thus, winning is strictly`bad news'. Since such o v erpayment i s incurred only by a partial owner, it is referred to as the`owner's curse'. This phenomenon, which m a y seem similar to the`winner's curse' in common-values auctions 3 is, in fact, quite dierent. As is well known, the standard winner's curse problem goes away once bidders choose their optimal bidding strategies. Bidding with toeholds, however, is a completely dierent story: the optimal bidding strategy has an`owner's curse' associated with it. The same considerations are later shown to hold even when the blockholder is capable of generating synergy gains of his own.
Additionally, the paper shows that due to partial ownership by a bidder, the private-values setup resembles somewhat a common-values one. The partial owner can gain not only because of his own high valuation but also from a competitor's high valuation. Thus a competitor's high valuation is no longer considered bad news, which is similar to a common-values setting 1 Bradley, Desai and Kim (1988) report that a majority of acquiring rms had toeholds prior to bidding. They report a signicant a v erage initial stake of about 10%. 2 Empirical studies have shown that (1) acquirer rms' share price appreciation at the time of acquisition is very low (Bradley, Desai and Kim (1988) , Jarrell, Brickley and Netter (1988) ); and (2) many acquirers suer long term losses from the acquisition (Scherer (1988) ).
and is in sharp contrast to a private-values one. Note that this eect is not due to a revision of valuations or to asymmetric information. Instead, the eect is solely due to the possibility of capital gains on the toehold.
Although progressive bidding is a common mechanism employed in the sale of large corporate assets, it is not the only one. In fact, a vast majority of corporate control transfers are mediated by i n v estment bankers who eectively conduct auctions among interested acquirers. In running such auctions, investment bankers can choose among various auction formats. This paper compares two common auction mechanisms and derives a surprising result: the target/selling rm is strictly worse o with a rst price sealed-bid auction than with a progressive bid auction. This result is in sharp contrast to the usual equivalence result found in the auction literature that assumes independent private-values and no toeholds (for example, Myerson (1981) ). However, the result is similar to the aliated-values case (for example, Milgrom and Weber (1982) ). This seeming paradox is explained by the observation that it is incentive compatible in the progressive bid auction to execute a commitment to bid at inated levels, due to the losing bidder's potential for capital gain on the toehold. However, such a strategy is not incentive-compatible in the rst price sealed-bid auction.
Another interesting implication of takeover contests with toeholds is that they automatically provide a rationale for initial bids with premia built into them. Unlike in existing models, there is no need to have m ultiple players with private valuations of the target in order to generate premium bids. Moreover, the willingness to post an initial bid with a higher premium is not necessarily associated with a higher valuation on the bidder's part. Indeed, a higher toehold suces to induce a blockholder to eectively impose a higher price level below which he will not permit a takeover attempt to go through.
The paper also shows that blockholders may act as costless defensive measures and contribute value to the rm even in the absence of monitoring considerations. This result implies that rms facing takeover threats may be better o increasing the eective block controlled by management. Such increases in block-size can be achieved by private placements, share repurchases or other leverage increasing strategies. Note that this advantage is not due to voting issues. Additionally, the opportunity cost of not having other defensive measures in place is decreasing in block-size. Thus, incorporating the blockholder's presence predicts that rms with smaller blockholders have a greater incentive to enact costly defensive measures like poison pills or golden parachutes.
To summarize, the paper makes the following predictions:
The conditional probability of a loss-making acquisition is higher if a large blockholder wins the takeover contest.
A large blockholder deters more acquirer types. Thus, the probability of a takeover attempt is smaller as the size of the blockholder increases.
Target rms with signicant blockholders choose not to be auctioned o under the rst price sealed-bid format.
Initial bid premia are increasing in the size of the block if the blockholder's valuation is publicly known.
The prots of outside acquirers become smaller as the block-size and, consequently, the initial bid premium, increases.
Firms are likely to undertake defensive measures like share repurchases, private placements or debt-for-equity s w aps to increase the eective block-size in the face of a takeover threat.
Firms with large blockholders are less likely to enact other defensive measures like poison pills and super-majority rules.
There are other papers in the literature that focus on the issue of toeholds. Grossman and Hart (1980) were most probably the rst to point to the possible use of toeholds in alleviating the free-rider problem inherent i n t a k eover bidding. 4 Shleifer and Vishny (1986) further developed this intuition. In their analysis, the acquirer is compensated for his costly investigative activities solely by the prots he makes on his toehold. Hirshleifer and Titman (1990) focus on share tendering decisions and allow the sole bidder to have a toehold before making a tender oer. Jegadeesh and Chowdhry (1989) extend the analysis to the case where the acquirer chooses his toehold strategically and develop a model in which the size of the toehold serves as a signal of the acquirer's valuation. The focus in this paper is quite dierent from that of these earlier papers. Here, for the most part, the free-rider problem is assumed away and, thus, an acquirer need not have a toehold in order to nd it optimal to bid for a target. In addition, the bidding game itself provides the opportunity for the bidder to signal his valuation should he choose to do so.
The idea that a blockholder's existence enables the target rm to capture a bigger fraction of the total surplus is also related to some other papers in the literature. Israel (1991) shows that a target rm can capture some of the surplus (ex-ante) by issuing high levels of debt. The value of the debt improves with a high-type acquirer and the target rm obtains the expected value of this improvement at the time of debt issuance. Israel (1992) uses the ability of the blockholders to block takeovers to extract all the surplus from the bidder, including their private benet of control. Stulz (1988) shows that an increase in the eective size of the incumbent blockholder, because of voting considerations, enables the target rm to extract more surplus from the acquirer. On a related note, Chowdhry and Nanda (1993) allow rms to issue debt with the same seniority as the existing debt, thus eroding the value of the old debtholders. They show that acquirer rms will have incentives to bid above their value in a takeover contest, thereby deterring entry.
In a contemporaneous paper, Burkart (1993) also explores the incentives of bidders with toeholds to bid above their valuations and independently derives results similar to some in this paper.
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His focus, however, is strictly on overbidding and he does not consider the implications of these results for the defensive strategies of target rms or for initial bid premia. In addition, this paper focuses on the benets to the target rm, leading to an exploration of the choice of sales procedures in which this tendency to overbid disappears. This paper, thus, shows that target rms should avoid these procedures. Burkart (1993) on the other hand, goes on to model the incentives to buy toeholds and sink information acquisition costs, an issue that is not discussed in this paper.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model. Section 3 analyzes the case of the incumbent-blockholder with no private information. Section 4 generalizes the model to two-sided asymmetric information. Section 5 compares the revenues generated under standard auction procedures. Section 6 develops implications of incumbent-blockholdings for initial bid premia and the optimality of defensive measures. All proofs are collected in the appendix.
The Basic Model
Consider an all-equity rm which is a potential acquisition target. An acquirer may bring synergistic gains to the rm which are unique to him. There are three kinds of players. A majority of the rm's equity is held by a continuum of atomistic shareholders. These shareholders are assumed passive in that they are willing to tender to the highest outstanding 5 We became aware of Burkart's working paper after the main results of this paper were developed. oer in any acquisition contest. That is, the model abstracts away from the free-rider problem in Grossman and Hart (1980) . In addition, there exists a single blockholder who holds an (0; 0:5) fraction of the rm's equity. The blockholder could be the incumbent manager, a passive i n v estor or a potential outsider acquirer. The third player is a potential outside acquirer 6 without any holdings in the rm. All players are assumed to be risk neutral.
The value of the rm's cash ows to shareholders under the incumbent management i s denoted by v c , while the value of cash ows under the outsider's control is denoted by v o . The blockholder provides competition to the outsider by participating in the bidding process. Cash ows generated under the blockholder's control have a v aluation of v b to him.
The outsider is assumed to discover the target rm with probability . On successful identication of the target, the outsider makes an acquisition oer. All acquisition oers are assumed to be cash tenders for all shares of the rm not held by the party making the oer. In particular, this implies that the outsider is required to make a n oer to all shareholders, while the blockholder, if he chooses to participate in the bidding, has to extend a cash oer to (1-) proportion of the shareholders. If the blockholder decides to contest the acquisition attempt, a progressive bidding contest ensues. As a matter of convention, we assume that the blockholder only has to match the outsider's outstanding oer in order for his bid to be considered more attractive. This assumption is partly motivated by the fact that the blockholder, unlike the outside bidder, already owns a fraction of the equity. Note, however, that the qualitative results do not, in any w a y , depend on this assumption.
The game is played as follows. The outsider makes the rst bid and the blockholder decides to match or pass. If the blockholder matches, the outsider has the option to raise the bid only by an amount (where = (v v) n ). The game continues until one of the players misses his turn and the other wins the contest and pays his bid. Imposing this rigid structure on the 6 The potential outside acquirer is also referred to as an outsider. 7 can also be thought of as the probability that the outsider realizes a value greater than that of the current management. In that case, the conditional density function of the outsider's valuation will need to be used and, as such, the results will have a dierent functional form. game allows us to solve the game via backward induction. The equilibrium concept used is one of sub-game perfection.
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If the game reaches a specic node (dened by the outstanding bid) the relevant information set of the player at that node is a singelton consisting of the outstanding bid of the other player. It is shown that at every node the players have a dominant c hoice on whether to increment the bid. Finally for ease of exposition, the results are presented in the limit as ! 0.
3 One-sided Asymmetric Information: The Incumbent Blockholder
Often the largest blockholder is the incumbent manager who derives some private benets of control. The incumbent's private benets of control are generally thought o f a s v aluereducing to the atomistic shareholders because they introduce a divergence of preferences between shareholders and management. Specically, the conventional wisdom has been that the resistance of managers to takeovers by more ecient rivals reduces the welfare of atomistic shareholders. In this section, the role of the incumbent in the capacity of a large blockholder is examined. The incumbent is often referred to as the blockholder. It is shown that the ownership of a large block, as well as private benets of control, can be benecial to atomistic shareholders.
The private benets considered in this section are non-pecuniary and ow from managerial entrenchment. Some examples of benets of entrenchment are the added prestige of managing a rm, an increase in outside opportunities with more experience, or the possibility of more outside directorships. Note that these private benets improve the welfare of the incumbent manager but they do not impose a direct cost on the atomistic shareholders or the rm. However, the private benets increase the incentives of the incumbent management to resist takeover activity and may impose an indirect cost on the shareholders. 9 Hirshleifer and P'ng (1989) analyze a model with a discrete valuation space, in which bidding as well as investigation is costly. In their model the usual dominant strategy on an English auction, of bidding up to one's valuation, is no longer true. Bidders might drop out rather than bear the cost of bidding. The rst bidder's initial bid, thus, deters investigation and also signals his valuation. In the current paper, the bidders are endowed with the information thus deterrence is not an issue. Bhattacharyya (1992) and Daniel and Hirshleifer (1992) have also shown the existence of an equilibrium in which the rst bidder signals his value and, thus, deters competition. Later in the paper it is argued that this separating equilibrium is not robust to existence of blockholdings. This paper, thus, ignores bidding costs and focuses on the eect of blockholdings in a standard English auction like set-up. That is, signalling strategies are ruled out. The incumbent's valuation of the benets of control can be publicly known or can be the incumbent-blockholder's private information. The former case is analyzed here, that is, v b is publicly known.
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The rst proposition shows that by virtue of his private benets and partial ownership, the incumbent-blockholder has incentives to provide competition to the outsider. Specically, the incumbent-blockholder is prepared to bid signicantly above the valuation of the cash ows that the rm could generate under his control.
Proposition 1 1. In a progressive bidding contest, the incumbent-blockholder with shareholding is prepared to bid up to a levelẑ>v b , wherê
In the limit, as ! 0, the blockholder is ready to match up to a price level P(v b ), where
2. The incumbent-blockholder contests any takeover attempt up to a level P(v b ) strictly greater than v b .
Proof(sketch): The progressive bidding contest is laid out as an extensive form game.
Given the assumption that the blockholder has to only match an outstanding bid to win a round of bidding, it is clear that matching a bid is a dominant strategy conditional on a decision to revise the bid. Since the outsider is cognizant of this response, sub-game perfection requires working backwards through the game tree. The detailed proof, provided in the appendix, shows that the decision to contest by the blockholder is of the bang-bang variety. That is, there exists a point P ( v b ), beyond which he will choose not to match but he will match all bids lower than P(v b ).
The above proposition establishes the fact that it is not optimal for the blockholder to accept a bid just because it has a premium attached. This conclusion is true even though value would increase only on the transfer of control. What is striking about the result is that the blockholder is willing to bid higher than his valuation and sustain a signicant loss in order to force the outsider to increase his oer. This would not be true if there were no 10 It is easy to show that if there existed a credible method of communicating the value of the private benet, the incumbent w ould do so. This communication would enable the incumbent to costlessly deter takeover attempts for low outsider types. This choice is not explicitly modelled in this paper: instead, it is assumed that the incumbent's private value is publicly known. toeholds established prior to the commencement of the bidding. It is precisely this chance of proting o the value enhancement of his toehold that gives the blockholder the incentive t o compete.
Though the blockholder is willing to put in a bid higher than his private value, he has no desire to win the contest. In the event he wins the contest, the blockholder signicantly overpays. Even though seemingly similar, this result is quite dierent from the`winner's curse' 11 usually referred to in common-values auctions. In common-values auctions, the winner's preliminary value estimate is the maximum of all other estimates and is upwardly biased. Thus, the winner of the auction has the added information that everyone else's value estimate was lower than his, forcing him to revise his value estimate downwards. Sophisticated bidders can take i n to account this eect by shading their bids downward in a sealed-bid auction, basing their bids on the value estimate conditional on their winning the auction. Thus the`winner's curse' goes away with sophisticated bidders. Here, however, the overpayment is not due to unsophisticated bidding. Instead, the blockholder knows with certainty that he will overpay on winning and still nds it optimal to bid at that level. As this overpayment is an artifact of partial ownership, this strong form of a`winner's curse' is referred to as the`owner's curse. ' For the rest of the paper, the discrete grid is ignored and the limit result is assumed to hold. That is, the blockholder is assumed to be willing to provide competition to all outsiders with valuations below P ( v b ).
Example: To illustrate the above result, assume that v o is distributed uniformly over the interval [0,1] and v b is also 0. Thus, the incumbent-blockholder has no private benets of control. The blockholder provides competition up to a price P such that = P:H(P). Using the denition of the hazard function, = P f(P ) 1 F (P) = P 1 P in the limit, as ! 0, the blockholder is willing to match up to price P, such that,
An example of the winner's curse can be found in Capen, Clapp and Campbell (1971) describing auctions for oil drilling rights.
The valuation of the blockholder has been normalized to 0. It is apparent that the blockholder is willing to bid above his valuation. Thus, if the blockholder owns 30% of the rm and values the rm at zero, he would be willing to bid up to 1+ = 23% of the maximum possible value. It is important to note that though the blockholder is willing to put in a premium bid, he has no desire to win the contest and hopes that the outsider will outbid him.
With only one outside acquirer, it is quite intuitive that the blockholder needs to provide credible competition to appropriate some of the surplus. However, there is no reason to believe that other outsiders cannot provide the same competition to the rst bidder.
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In this case it may appear that the blockholder can safely decrease the level of competition that he needs to provide. However, this observation is not true. The next result establishes that the blockholder's strategy is invariant across single-and multiple-outsider cases.
Proposition 2 With outsiders having valuations distributed identically and independently with a positive hazard r ate, the bidding strategy of the incumbent-blockholder in a progressive bid auction is invariant to the number of bidders.
To get an intuition for the result, one has to ask the question whether the blockholder will match up to a bid higher than the case in which there was only one outsider. Given that the outsiders' valuations are independent, the distribution of the last-remaining bidder's value conditioned on the existing bid is no dierent from that of a single-outsider's distribution conditioned on the same existing bid. This fact can be used to show that the blockholder will not nd it optimal to match at a price higher than that for the single-outsider case. As a r esult, for the rest of the paper, we assume that there exists only one outsider.
The progressive bidding contest could, in principle, start from the lowest point i n t h e support and ratchet up to the point where one bidder drops out of the contest. Since the blockholder's strategy is common knowledge in equilibrium, it is known that the blockholder will match all bids below P ( v b ). Thus, there exist numerous sequences of bids where the outsider can start the bidding at any price below P ( v b ), but will always have to buy the rm for P(v b ). With existed some costs of delay, the outsider will not nd it optimal to put in a bid which will have to be revised upwards with probability 1. That is, the outsider will nd it optimal to start the bidding at P(v b ). As a result, any equilibrium which is robust to an introduction of such costs entails a take-it-or-leave-it oer at P(v b ), that is accepted. In this 12 Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) report that 60% of the rms in their sample of successful takeovers received a single bid.
paper, such an equilibrium is referred to as a robust equilibrium. Corollary 1 characterizes the robust equilibrium. In the rest of the paper attention is restricted to robust equilibria.
Corollary 1 With costs of delay, in a robust equilibrium, 1. All outsiders with valuations less than P(v b ) do not bid; 2. All outsiders with valuations above P(v b ) bid P(v b ); and 3. The blockholder does not incur losses in equilibrium.
The eect of block-size on the minimum price conditional on a takeover, the probability of a takeover and the prots of the outsider is unambiguous. The bigger the block the higher the price up to which the blockholder is willing to compete with the outsider. Consequently, a bigger block ensures that the rm gets a higher price conditional on a successful takeover. Thus, outsider prots are decreasing in block-size. However, the probability of a takeover happening is also decreasing in block size. The proposition below presents these comparative statics.
Proposition 3 An increase in the block-size results in a:
1. Higher price c onditional on takeover; 2. Lower probability of takeover; and 3. Lower outsider prot for every realization of the outsider's valuation.
The eect of block-size on the market price, however, is not so obvious. With probability , the outsider identies the target. Then the outsider takes it over by p a ying the price P(v b ) if his valuation is above P ( v b ). Thus, the market value of the rm is given by
Note that the term in parentheses on the right is decreasing in P(v b ). Thus, it is not clear that v m is increasing in P(v b ). However, for v b =0, the incentives of the blockholder are perfectly aligned with those of the rm and the atomistic shareholders. P(v b ) is optimally chosen by the blockholder and is always optimal for the rm value if v b =0. The intuition is not so clear when the blockholder has some private benets. In the robust equilibrium the blockholder may end up deterring the outsider to levels higher than the rm-value maximizing levels. The next proposition gives conditions under which the market value of the rm is increasing in block-size.
Proposition 4 2. Specically, for v b =0, the market price is increasing for every . Mikkelson and Ruback (1985) show that the value of a target rm substantially increases whenever someone acquires a toehold of 5% or more. The increase is signicant e v en when the blockholder declares that the block is for investment purposes only. Proposition 4 establishes that even in the absence of any signalling of future takeover activities or any v oting considerations, the establishment of a signicant toehold may enhance market value. Since no signalling stories need be invoked to explain the Mikkelson and Ruback (1985) result, it should be apparent that such an increase in the price need not be temporary. Although Mikkelson and Ruback (1985) do not pursue the issue of whether the stock price valuation they document is long-term or not, it would be interesting to see whether the data supports a long-term enhancement of market value even when subsequent e v ents do not entail a takeover attempt. What is innovative about this result is that the information that is communicated to the market by the increased holding is not of the asymmetric variety. The mere establishment of the toehold credibly commits the blockholder to a dierent strategy in the future, which leads to the current v alue enhancement.
Example: The intuition behind the above proposition can be illustrated by solving for the optimal , assuming that v o is uniformly distributed over the interval [0, 1] . Assume that the incumbent's value of benets of control is 0.3. The optimal can then be shown to be 40%, and the price up to which the incumbent will deter is 0.5. Surprisingly, such a high private benet of control ends up helping the atomistic shareholders even when it is publicly known. Stulz (1988) also shows that the value of the rm increases with the size of the incumbent's block as it reduces the shares available to an outsider. 13 Stulz, however, assumes that the 13 Stulz assumes that the supply curve of tendered shares is upward sloping in the premium oered to the incumbent does not compete with the outsider for control. Instead, the outsider's presence just reduces the probability of success. In contrast, in this paper the incumbent is committed to compete at all prices below P (v b ), consequently, the advantage of the incumbent's block i s not due to voting considerations.
Propositions 1 and 4 help rationalize management's attempts to buy the rm in the face of an hostile takeover. In doing so, management is often accused of not acting in the shareholders' interest.
14 The premium the managers are ready to pay for the rm is cited as evidence of managers' unimplemented ability to improve the rm. Proposition 1, however, demonstrates that the premium the manager is ready to pay for the rm may instead be an indicator of his private benet. This result also establishes that if the management team attempts a buyout and is forced to bid higher than its initial bid due to competition, it does not necessarily imply that the management team was`stealing the rm' at its initial bid.
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Such bidding in the face of competition is, in fact, benecial to the shareholders and may e v en be at the cost of the incumbent management. Atomistic shareholders, although desirous of takeover challenges in the face of entrenched management, nevertheless gain from the management's benets of entrenchment.
In the previous section, the blockholder was the incumbent who had no incentive to acquire the rm outside the context of a bidding contest. In general, however, the blockholder may be an outsider, who also has access to some synergies. In this section, the blockholder is assumed to be privately informed about his own valuation (v b ) and, v b and v o are i.i.d. with density functions of f(v) over [0,v] . As a result, the blockholder is best thought o f a s a potential acquirer who has gained a toehold up-front. Therefore, unlike the previous section, the blockholder has incentives to acquire the rm even in the absence of a competing bidder. atomistic shareholders and that the target management v alues control so much that it never tenders. As a result, a large block in the hands of the incumbent reduces the probability of success and forces the outsider to increase the bid. Thus, an increase in the incumbent's block increases the bid premium. However, the increase also reduces the probability of a successful takeover and, thus, leads to an interior optimal block-size. 14 See Jensen and Meckling (1976) .
This paper does not attempt to explain or defend the motives of the management team. The results demonstrate that providing competition to the outsider does not necessarily prove the accusation made by the popular press to be true. The blockholder's bidding strategy now depends not only on the size of his block but also on his private valuation. The possibility of a blockholder bidding above his value generalizes to this setting. 16 Corollary 2 1. Even when the blockholder's synergy is private information he is still willing to compete up to the same price level as when the synergy is publicly known. That is, the blockholder is ready to match up to a price level P(v b ), where
2. The blockholder contests any takeover attempt up to a level P(v b ) strictly greater than v b .
The incorporation of possible synergy gains on the part of the blockholder changes the problem under analysis from a situation with one-sided asymmetric information to one with two-sided asymmetric information. However, the outsider was playing his dominant strategy in the previous section, which did not depend on the realization of the blockholder's valuation. Thus, the same result goes through. The proof of the above corollary is omitted as it directly follows from the proof of proposition 1.
In this section, the generalization allows for the possibility of contests to occur. As a result, there now exists the possibility that, in the process of trying to extract surplus from the outsider, the blockholder ends up incurring a loss with positive probability. The`owner's curse' considerations introduced in the earlier section now become an equilibrium outcome.
Proposition 5 If the blockholder's value is not publicly known, he incurs a loss (overpays), with a strictly positive probability.
Empirical studies have discovered that over the long term, from one to three years, acquirer rms incur losses.
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These losses, though not statistically signicant, are a little puzzling. Event studies on takeovers have reported that the stock market also considers many acquisitions`bad news' for the acquirer rms.
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In fact, average prots over the acquisition period 16 In fact, the result that the blockholders are willing to bid strictly above their private value generalizes to the presence of multiple blockholders. A closed form solution is presented in proposition 6.
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See Jensen and Ruback (1983) and Scherer (1988) .
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See Mikkelson and Ruback (1985) , Bradley, Desai and Kim (1988) and Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993). are not signicantly dierent from zero. Previous work has identied a few possible reasons for acquirers to incur losses in equilibrium. One explanation given is that the managers are less informed than the market about the valuation of the target. Thus, there will exist instances when the acquiring managers make v aluation mistakes but the market price reects the true values. However, it is not clear why managers do not withdraw their bid, if valuation error is the source of losses, when they observe the market's negative reaction. Typically, managers instead raise the bid even after observing a negative reaction to their initial bids. Agency problems have been identied as another possible cause for loss makingacquisitions. Managers of acquiring rms may not be acting in the best interests of shareholders while making acquisition decisions. Several motives have been assigned to managers for going on an acquisition binge. Some examples are diversication of managers' personal portfolios (Amihud and Lev (1981) ), use of free cash ow to increase the size of the rm (Jensen (1976) ), and an increase of the rm's dependence on management (Shleifer and Vishny (1989) ). Roll (1986) puts forward the`hubris' hypothesis to explain why many acquiring rms incur losses. The hubris hypothesis closely parallels the`winner's curse'. Suppose there exist no possible gains to takeover activity. Managers, according to Roll, trust their own valuations more than they trust the market valuation. Takeovers will be attempted only when the managers believe they have found undervalued rms. If the market's and managers' valuations (in an expected sense) are both correct, takeover attempts will only occur in rms where managers' estimates are biased upward. As a result they will incur losses in takeovers. Managers, because of their hubris, refuse to account for the biases in their estimates. Consequently they suer losses, exactly the behavior of unsophisticated bidders in a common-values auction who do not adjust for the`winner's curse.' This paper predicts that some of the losses observed in long term studies could well be due to the`owner's curse.' The blockholder can gain from the higher valuation of the bidder through capital gains on his block. Thus, a blockholder has incentives to increase the bid to capture some of the rents on his block. Similar to the common-values problem, there will exist instances when the blockholder will end up ratcheting up to and winning at a price above his valuation. Thus the assumed private-values set-up resembles a common-values problem. Note, however, that in this model the blockholder knows while putting in a bid that he will incur a loss on winning but still nds it optimal to do so. In contrast, the sophisticated common-values bidder adjusts his bid strategy to the point that he expects to gain on winning the bid. This section has shown that the`owner's curse' becomes an equilibrium outcome with two-sided asymmetric information. The blockholder contests the outsider's bids when he has private information on the synergistic gains he can bring to the table. As the degree of competition provided depends on the value realization of the blockholder (his private information) there exist instances when he incurs a loss in equilibrium. This loss is surprising because it is not due to evaluation errors or agency conicts. In fact, the bidder knows with certainty that he will incur the loss if the bid is successful.
The results of this section are similar to those in Burkart (1993) . He analyzes a secondprice auction and shows that bidders with toeholds overbid. He goes on to show that overbidding also occurs in an ascending bid auction. In Burkart's model, contests always take place and, more importantly, control is always transferred to either the blockholder or the outsider. This paper, by analyzing a well specied, extensive form process and by focusing on the notion of a robust equilibrium, shows that the deterrence achieved by the blockholder reduces his losses relative to those when he is always forced to bid by assumption. These considerations are especially important in situations where the blockholder's valuation is publicly known or where the blockholder is the incumbent. Moreover, as the next section shows, the incentive t o o v erbid goes away when the sealed-bid auction employs the rst price rule, which is the most common rule employed in this context. As a result, this paper also establishes the superiority of progressive bid contests from the point of view of atomisitic shareholders.
Choice of Auction Format
Takeover bidding is best described by a progressive bidding contest. However, this is not the only way corporate control is transferred.
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Sometimes the Board of Directors hires an agent 20 to sell the rm. This section examines the incentives of the blockholder and the outsider in a sealed-bid rst price auction and compares the resulting expected revenue with that under a progressive bid auction. The question asked is simple: is there an advantage to selling the rm under a progressive bid auction?
This question is interesting because in an independent private-values setting with riskneutral bidders, the progressive bid auction and the rst price auction generate the same 19 In fact, a signicant n umber of mergers are initiated by the seller without the backdrop of a competitive bidding situation. expected revenue for the seller.
21
This result cannot be directly applied here because one of the potential bidders, the blockholder, owns a fraction of the object to be auctioned. That is, he may gain from his opponent winning the auction and may incur losses if he wins himself, which gives rise to the`owner's curse' mentioned earlier.
The rst price auction is the most prevalent format for sealed-bid auctions.
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In this setting, the loser cannot directly inuence the price paid by the winner. However, in the progressive bid auction, the loser can inuence the price paid by the winner by competing up to a certain price level. This dierence has important implications when bidders have toeholds. Specically, the next proposition establishes that in the context of a sale to bidders who may already have toeholds, it is not optimal for the target rm to conduct a rst price sealed-bid auction.
In this section we assume that there exist two blockholders with symmetric block-sizes (). The blockholders have private information on their independently drawn value from the uniform distribution over the interval [0, 1] . Given these assumptions the next proposition shows that the progressive bid auction generates a higher revenue than the rst price sealedbid auction. The example following the proposition shows that the result is also true in the one-sided asymmetric information case. In a progressive bid contest, a blockholder bids above his valuation to try and obtain some of the surplus from the other bidder. He does this because his bid not only aects the probability of selling the rm to the other bidder but also establishes the price at which i t is sold to the other bidder. In a rst price auction, the blockholder's bid only aects the probability of selling the rm to the other bidder and does not, in equilibrium, directly aect the price paid by the outsider. Thus, in this auction format, the blockholder has a reduced incentive to put in a bid higher than one with no blockholding.
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Revenue equivalence theorem (Myerson (1981) and Riley and Samuelson (1981) ).
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This prevalent c hoice by sellers could be in response to bidder risk-aversion (Mathews (1980) and Maskin and Riley (1984) ) or the ability of bidders to collude in the second-price auction format (Back and Zender (1993) ).
Example: To clarify the intuition for the above proposition we solve for the equilibrium in a one-sided asymmetric information case with one blockholder who has no synergies [v b =0] . From proposition 1 the blockholder in a progressive bid auction would be willing to bid up to P(0), which is greater than 0. Thus, the expected revenue of the rm in this auction would be given by, P r o b [ v o > P (0)]P(0) which is positive.
For the rst price sealed-bid auction, let the outsider's bidding function be b(v). In this one-sided asymmetric information example it is not possible to use the concept of a symmetric Nash equilibrium as is often done for the two-sided asymmetric information case. Thus, to choose a particular equilibrium, players are restricted from playing weakly dominated strategies.
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The blockholder's bid of 0 is rst shown to weakly dominate all other positive bids (K). The following table provides the payos of bidding any positive n umber K and that of bidding 0.
Payos to the blockholder.
Bidding K: Bidding 0:
From the table above, bidding 0 weakly dominates bidding any positive K for all b(v), specifically for b(v)=0. The best response to the blockholder bidding 0 is b(v)=0. Thus, the expected revenue for the rm is zero which is strictly less than that of the progressive bid auction.
Although the outsider's valuation for the rm is purely private, the establishment o f a toehold by the blockholder gives him a stake in the outsider's valuation. As far as the blockholder is concerned, a higher valuation on the outsider's part is`good news' as opposed to the no-toehold case in which a higher valuation for the opponent is always`bad-news.' The toehold introduces elements of a common-values problem into the bidding framework. However, the common-values feature alluded to above is not informational in nature. That is, knowledge of the opponent's valuation does not cause the blockholder to revise his own valuation estimate.
Thus, it is not surprising that due to these elements of common-values the choice of a sale procedure resembles the one predicted by aliated-values models. Milgrom and Weber 23 The same equilibrium can by obtained by restricting attention to equilibria which are trembling hand perfect. (1982) show that if bidders' valuations are aliated, the second price auction is dominated by an ascending bid auction. They use the`linkage principle' to explain the above result: bids in an ascending bid auction convey valuation relevant information to all bidders. Thus, a higher bid by one bidder positively inuences valuation estimates of all other bidders. An ascending bid auction exploits this ability of bidders to condition their valuations on other bidders' bids and improves the seller's expected revenue by enhancing competition.
6 Implications of Incumbent Blockholdings:
Initial Bid Premia:
Empirical studies have concluded that initial bids in takeovers are almost always at a signicant premium over the market price. 24 This section shows that the existence of a blockholder may w ell lead to an initial bid premium. It has already been established in an earlier section that in the robust equilibrium, the outsider starts the bidding at a level not less than the price up to which the blockholder is committed to contest. If the original market price is less than this price level, the rst bid will be at a premium. The next proposition establishes sucient conditions for initial bid premia to arise.
Proposition 7 In the robust equilibrium the initial bid will be a t a p r emium if the probability of the target being discovered ( ) is small enough. P'ng (1986) and Fishman (1988) explain the existence of initial bid premia by showing that outsiders have an incentive to put in a preemptive bid to signal their valuations and avoid competition from other potential acquirers. In Fishman's model, a high type acquirer's premium bid signals his type and preempts the competitor's investigation. Bhattacharyya (1992) and Daniel and Hirshleifer (1992) show that the signalling intuition is robust, even when there are no investigation costs. They show that a separating signalling equilibrium exists where the high type acquirer chooses to put in a higher bid. Thus, a larger set of competitor types is deterred.
The signalling equilibrium, in Bhattacharyya (1992) and Daniel and Hirshleifer (1992) , is not robust to target shareholders' ability to subsidize another outsider for providing competi-
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For example, Bradley (1980) reports that the average price paid was 49% higher than the price two months before the oer. tion to the rst bidder. If there exists a blockholder, then he himself can provide competition. Thus, he can extract all the surplus by bidding just below the valuation of the outsider, which is known in a separating equilibrium. The possibility of such an action by the blockholder kills the incentives of high type acquirers to separate themselves.
In this paper, initial bid premia, arise not because the outsider bids to signal his valuation but because the blockholder's presence forces him to do so. The blockholder deters the low type outsiders and the high type outsiders pay at least P(v b ) to get the rm. If the blockholder is the incumbent, or if he cannot bring any synergies to the rm, then he does not bid in the robust equilibrium. Thus, either the takeover is successful at price P(v b ) o r i t d o e s n o t t a k e place. The market price is just the expectation of the value in two m utually exclusive e v ents and is, consequently, less than P(v b ). If the blockholder is not the incumbent, then the same logic gives rise to initial bid premia as long as the market value is close enough to v c .
In the current paper, the size of the premia is invariant to the valuation of the outsider. In this model, higher initial bid premia are due to a high P(v b ), and will be associated with lower outsider prots and not higher outsider prots as some of the extant literature suggests.
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This prediction is empirically testable. Another testable implication of proposition 7 is that rms with large blockholders will have higher bid premia compared to rms with smaller blockholders. An increase in block-size has a rst-order eect on the initial bid and a secondorder eect on the market price. An increase in increases P(v b ) and will thus increase the initial bid premium. The next corollary summarizes the above assertions without proof.
Corollary 3 1. The initial bid premium is increasing in block-size.
2. Lower outsider's prots are associated with higher initial bid premia.
Takeover Defense by Increasing Block-Size
The previous sections have demonstrated that the existence of large blockholders reduces the probability of a takeover. Their presence also helps target shareholders appropriate a larger fraction of the surplus from an outsider. This section shows that some of the prevalent takeover defenses may be attempts to increase the eective block-size. Though they reduce the probability of a takeover, they are still benecial for small shareholders.
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For example, Hirshleifer and Titman (1990) , Bhattacharyya (1992) and Daniel and Hirshleifer (1992) .
Private Placements and Share Repurchases
There exists some anecdotal evidence that managers use private placement of equity i n a s a takeover defense. The model developed in this paper helps identify the advantage to shareholders of private placements. Even if a rm can place shares at the current market price (which will be lower than the ex-placement price), it will choose to place at least a fraction of its total shares with a single, self-interested blockholder like the incumbent. It might seem that by placing shares at a price lower than the ex-placement price the rm is acting irrationally, giving wealth away. H o w ever, this presumption is not true. Instead, by doing so, it can expropriate some of the surplus of a potential bidder and make existing shareholders better o. The above i n tuition is summarized, without proof, in corollary 4.
Corollary 4 Placing blocks in the hands of incumbent management can improve the welfare of small shareholders even if it is done at the pre-placement price which is strictly lower than the ex-placement price.
Example: An example will clarify the above i n tuition. Assume that the outsider's value (v o ) is distributed uniformly over [0, 1] . If the rm could place a fraction with a blockholder, then he will deter all outsider types up to
1+
, and force all outsider types in the upper pool to pay
. The rm will choose the optimal to maximize the value of the remaining fraction. In this example, the expected value of the remaining rm is just However, if the rm has no blockholders its value will be equal to the value under the current management, which has been normalized to 0. Put dierently, the rm has no bargaining power without blockholders, and will get the bottom of the support of outsider's valuation.
The example illustrates the advantage of having a block e v en if it is given at the current price of zero.
Share repurchases can also increase the rm's current v alue by eectively increasing the block-size and, consequently, capturing a larger fraction of the surplus conditional on a suc-cessful takeover. Stulz (1988) has a similar result. He shows that, because of voting considerations, rms can benet by repurchasing shares before, or in the midst of, a takeover battle. In the current paper, the benet of eectively increasing the block-size is not due to voting considerations. Instead, the benet is due to the enhancement of the blockholder's pre-commitment to compete.
Consider now a rm which has a small blockholder and is confronted with a choice between paying a cash dividend or repurchasing shares. Both decisions equally aect the cash resources and the total value of the rm under current management. However, the share repurchase increases the block-size and, thus, the rm is able to appropriate a bigger fraction of the surplus conditional on a successful takeover. Consequently, the rm value is greater after a share repurchases than after disbursement of a cash dividend. This is summarized, without proof, in the next corollary.
Corollary 5 For a small initial block-size, a rm will be b etter o repurchasing shares rather than paying out cash dividends.
Example: Assume a uniform distribution on v o over the support [1, 2] . Let the value of the rm's cash ow under current management be 1 and let the size of the blockholder be 10%.
26
The rm has excess cash of 0.1. If it pays it as dividend, the cum-dividend value of the rm can be calculated to be 1.1826, where 0.0826 is the expected gains from takeover. If, instead, the rm opts for a share repurchase from atomistic shareholders, the block-size is 10.92%, and the per-share rm value can be calculated to be 1.1887, which is greater than before. The change in per-share rm value is due to an increase in expected gains from a takeover, which are now equal to 0.0887. Dann and DeAngelo (1988) study the restructuring decisions of 39 rms facing hostile takeovers. There is ample evidence in their sample of rms consolidating blockholders' positions via private placement (14 rms) and share repurchases (8 rms). Out of their sample of 39, 3 rms engaged in both private placement and share repurchases, which i s e v en stronger evidence of the advantage of consolidation of blocks in the face of a takeover threat. The normalization of vc to 0 is inconvenient here and is therefore relaxed.
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Although these facts match with the prediction of the previous results, contrary to the prediction here the market on average did not react favorably to these transactions.
Short-Term Capital Structure Changes
The model developed in this paper also has implications for short term capital structure changes brought about in the face of a takeover threat. Issuing debt or preferred shares in lieu of stock will consolidate the holding of the blockholder and help the rm appropriate a larger fraction of the surplus. Thus, the model predicts that takeover targets would load up on debt with either a debt-for-equity s w ap or by issuing new debt and repurchasing stock. The intuition is similar to the share-repurchases example with cash in hand and is summarized, without proof, in the next corollary.
Corollary 6 Potential takeover targets will gain by undertaking debt-for-equity swaps.
It is important to note that the prediction of the above corollary is not due to changes in voting rights, even though it matches with that of Harris and Raviv (1988) and Stulz (1988) . We are not aware of any empirical study that rigorously studies the incentive of rms to increase leverage in the face of a takeover threat. Harris and Raviv (1988) report that Herztberg(1985) , in a Wall Street Journal article, claimed that takeover targets increase debt levels.
Stock Compensation
Another implication of the above proposition is that paying the managers with stock o f the rm or stock options is better than paying them cash even in the absence of agency considerations. Compensating by stock increases the block controlled by the management and helps the atomistic shareholders in extracting more surplus from the outsider. The advantage of issuing stock options is quite similar. If the managers can increase the price the rm gets in a takeover contest, it naturally increases the value of their stock options.
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The above i n tuition is summarized, without proof, in the next corollary.
Corollary 7 If the manager owns a small block, granting stocks or stock options as compensation to the manager increases P (v b ) in the case of a takeover attempt and can improve the welfare o f s t o ckholders.
Assuming the stock options are still valid after a successful takeover or can be exercised on or before the tender date.
Implications for Defensive Measures
Share repurchases, private placements of equity, short-term capital structure changes and stock compensation plans discussed above are examples of rms taking steps to extract more, in expectation, from outsiders. These are not the only possible measures rms could take t o gain a better position in a takeover contest. Firms that believe they are potential takeover targets often erect barriers to takeover activity b y enacting other defensive measures like poison pills, super-majority rules, golden parachutes, dual-class shares and staggered boards. These defensive measures tilt the playing eld in favor of the incumbent management i n a n y control contest. It may seem that the benet to the incumbent management is always at the cost of existing shareholders. This observation, however, is not true. We next study the advantage of these measures to target rms.
One can view defensive measures like poison pills as commitment mechanisms that the incumbent management will repeal, or be forced to repeal by the courts, when faced with a high enough oer. Such a defensive measure lowers the probability of a takeover but increases the price paid conditional on a takeover. Such defensive measures do allow for entrenchment and are potentially costly.
As far as the rm is concerned, an incumbent blockholder, especially if he has no private information, is isomorphic to such a defensive measure. He deters low-type acquirers and ensures that high-type acquirers pay a minimum price. The optimal tradeo between the probability of takeover and the price received conditional on a takeover can be obtained by picking the appropriate block-size. The incumbent will act strategically to maximize the private benet of control and the value of the block.
One implication of the above assertion is that rms with large blockholders have a smaller increase in rm value by putting a defensive measure in place. Thus, rms with large blockholders have less incentives to enact defensive measures, especially if defensive measures have associated costs. The above i n tuition is stated without proof in the next corollary.
Corollary 8 The disadvantage of not having an optimal induced defense is decreasing in . That is, rms with small blockholders have a greater incentive to enact costly defensive measures.
There exists some weak evidence supporting this prediction. A poison pill provision is an example of a costly defensive measure. Malatesta and Walkling (1988) report that rms in which the management team owned lower than average stock holdings were more likely to enact poison pill provisions. Their reasoning for this result is quite dierent from that advanced in this paper. They argue that if managers own a higher fraction of the rm, they bear a higher cost, due to a lower stock price, of enacting such provisions.
Conclusion and Possible Extensions
This paper has analyzed the behavior of bidders who have already gained a toehold in a takeover contest. These blockholders could be passive i n v estors, outsider acquirers or the incumbent management. It has been shown that a blockholder, because of his partial ownership, suers from an`owner's curse.' That is, in order to extract greater surplus from another acquirer, a blockholder has an incentive to bid above his valuation and possibly suer signicant losses in equilibrium. The`owner's curse' is dierent from the well known`winner's curse' that occurs in common-values auctions. Thus, the paper has provided an explanation for bidders to rationally incur losses in equilibrium without recourse to agency problems or hubris even though there is perfect knowledge of private valuations.
Firms with blockholders are shown to have a strict preference for a progressive bid auction, which is the most prevalent mechanism. More importantly, it has been shown that the intuition gained from analyzing sale procedures without toeholds does not extend to the presence of blockholdings. For a progressive bid contest, the existence of of initial bid premia in the presence of blockholdings has also been demonstrated.
The existence of a blockholder has been shown to benet the rm, specically the small atomistic shareholders. Blockholders act as surrogate defensive measures helping the small shareholders appropriate a larger fraction of the surplus from the acquirer. The defense provided by a large blockholder is costless and the commitment of the blockholder to compete does not suer from any credibility problems. Firms can increase the eectiveness of a blockholder defense by optimally adjusting block-size. This result can be one possible reason for rms to engage in private placements, share repurchases or debt-for-equity s w aps in the face of takeover threats. The model also shows that rms with relatively smaller blockholders have greater incentives to enact defensive measures like poison pills and super-majority rules et cetera.
It has also been shown that the incumbent management's incentive to resist a takeover, because of their private benets of control, can be used to improve the welfare of atomistic shareholders. Such incentives can be forever enhanced by making the incumbent a large blockholder. Thus, the paper identies another reason, other than that of aligning incentives, for granting stock rights and stock options to managers. In addition, it has been demonstrated that a premium bid put in by incumbent management t o p r o vide competition does not necessarily imply that the management team was not earlier acting in the shareholders' interest. Nor does it necessarily imply that the management is attempting to`steal the rm.' Recognizing the incentives of management t o p r o vide competition helps explain the incidence of loss-making MBOs.
The RHS is strictly increasing in P (), is equal to 0 at P = v b and is unbounded from above a s P approaches v. T h us, there will exist a P(vbper) which satises the above equality.
Proof of proposition 2: The dominant strategy of all bidders without toeholds is to bid up to their valuation. As a result, as long as there exist two bidders who are competing in the auction the blockholder need not enter into bidding. The relevant question, then, is whether the blockholder should match the highest bidder if he is the only one left. But that is exactly the same problem as the single outsider one. Specically, assume that all bidders except one drop out at a priceP, and the blockholder has a choice whether to match the bid of the remaining bidder. The conditional density of the remaining bidder is exactly the same as the conditional density of a single bidder being abovê P. Given the privateness of valuations, all other bidders' valuations being belowP gives no new information to the blockholder. Thus, the problem is isomorphic to the single bidder case. If he was ready to match a t P he will do the same now.
Proof of proposition 3: All we need to show is that the price level P up to which the blockholder is willing to match is increasing in . The relevant P is the solution to
The right hand side of equation 2 is increasing in P because H() is assumed to be increasing. For a given , a higher value of P will satisfy the equation.
Proof of proposition 4: Let all outsiders with valuations less than K be deterred and the rest takeover the rm and pay K. The market value of the rm is then K(1 F(K)) which is maximized at K such that K H(K ) = 1 and the market value is increasing in K for all K < K .
In equilibrium the blockholder chooses P(v b ) such that (P(v b ) v b )H(P(v b )) = . A t v b = K and = 0 the blockholder chooses to deter up to P = K which is the optimal level of deterrence. For > 0, the blockholder will deter to a P > K and, thus, any > 0 will reduce rm value. For v b < K and = 0 the blockholder chooses to deter up to v b which is less than K . A n increase in strictly increases P(v b ) (proposition 3) and thus increases rm value up to the point where P(v b ) is equal to K . This limiting value of is labelled as If v b = 0, then the blockholder chooses to deter up to P H ( P ) = . less than 1 implies P(0) < K for all , that is = 1 .
Proof of proposition 5: All outsiders in a robust equilibrium with P(v b =0) will not bid but the blockholder will have to contest the bids of outsiders with valuations above P ( v b =0). As P(v b ) is greater than v b , for all outsiders' value realizations between v b and P(v b ) the blockholder will end up winning the contest and paying v o , which is higher than v b . As Prob[v b < v o < P ( v b )] is strictly positive, the blockholder will overpay with strictly positive probability.
Proof of proposition 6
First Price auction The valuations of the blockholders is v 1 and v 2 , which are i.i.d. uniform 
Assuming a symmetric equilibrium implies h 1 () = h 2 ( ) = h ( ). Thus the above rst order conditions reduce to: 
Progressive Bid Auction Let l i (v) (for i=1,2) be the bidding functions of the two blockholders.
That is the blockholders will bid up to l i (v).
The expected prot of bidder 1 of bidding b conditional on value realization v 1 is given by, 
Comparing the expected revenues for the two auction procedures (equations 8 and 9) it can be easily shown that the expected revenue in the progressive bid auction is higher than that in the rst price auction for all less than 1.
Proof of Proposition 7: In a robust equilibrium outsider's will start bidding below P ( v b =0).
For initial bid premia to exist all we need to show is that the market price will be less than P(v b =0). The market price is given by the expectation of the price obtained in a takeover contest times the probability of the target being discovered. If the blockholder is committed to deter up to P then v m = [F (P) 0 + ( 1 F ( P )) Mi n [ P;v o ]] v m approaches 0 (normalization of current v alue) as goes to zero. Thus for small enough the initial bid will be at a premium to the market value.
